Within the seminal cobweb model of Brock and Hommes, firms adapt their price expectations by a profit-based switching behavior between free naïve expectations and costly rational expectations. Brock and Hommes demonstrate that fixed-point dynamics may turn into increasingly complex dynamics as the firms' intensity of choice increases. We show that policy-makers are able to manage rational routes to randomness by adjusting profit taxes. As suggested by our analytical and numerical analysis, policy-makers should increase (decrease) profit taxes if destabilizing expectations generate higher (lower) profits than stabilizing expectations to alter the composition of applied expectation rules and thereby to promote market stability. Our results are not restricted to cobweb models: a huge body of literature demonstrates that rational routes to randomness may emerge in many different markets.
Introduction
International stock and foreign exchange markets are highly volatile and regularly produce severe bubbles and crashes. In this respect, the dot-com bubble and the stark up-and-down movements of the euro-dollar exchange rate are just two notorious examples of many. Real estate and commodity markets may also be subject to dramatic fluctuations. Between 2000 and 2005, for instance, housing prices in the United States almost doubled. Similarly, the prices of oil, gold and various agricultural goods occasionally display alarming boom and bust dynamics. Sometimes even the real economy undergoes major changes, after which we observe pronounced variations of central macroeconomic variables such as inflation and national income. While we have repeatedly encountered difficult economic periods in the past -detailed historical accounts can be found in Kindleberger (2000) , Shiller (2005) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) -the recent global financial and economic crisis urgently reminds us just how vulnerable modern economies can be.
Models with heterogeneous interacting agents undoubtedly help us to gain a better understanding of the intricate behavior of many different markets. The key characteristics of these models are that agents are boundedly rational, display a rule-governed behavior and interact with each other. General surveys of this line of research are provided by Chiarella et al. (2009) , Hommes and Wagener (2009) and Lux (2009) . A seminal contribution in this area is the cobweb model by Brock and Hommes (1997) . Note that cobweb models are important benchmark models in economic dynamics; they describe price dynamics in a competitive market for a non-storable good that takes one time period to produce. Due to the production lag, firms must form price expectations one time period ahead. An important feature of the cobweb model by Brock and Hommes (1997) is that firms endogenously switch between different expectation rules. In particular, firms can either use a free naïve or a costly rational expectation rule and update their (boundedly) rational choices according to the relative past performance of the respective rules.
A central insight generated by this model is that an increase in the firms' intensity of choice may turn fixed-point dynamics into increasingly complex and volatile dynamics. This bifurcation structure, which Brock and Hommes (1997) call a rational route to randomness, may be understood as follows. Suppose that the demand and supply conditions are such that the model's unique steady state is stable if half of the firms use naïve expectations while it is unstable if all firms rely on naïve expectations. Moreover, note that prediction errors of naïve expectations are rather low as the price approaches its steady-state value. Close to the steady state, naïve expectations generate higher profits than costly rational expectations since they are free. Now, the intensity of choice indicates how sensitively firms react to profit differences between their expectation rules. Let us contrast two extreme scenarios. First, if the intensity of choice is low, firms react only weakly to profit differences of their expectation rules. The use of (destabilizing) naïve and (stabilizing) rational expectations is then roughly balanced, and the steady state is stable. Second, if the intensity of choice is high, naïve expectations will be more popular, and the steady state will be unstable. However, this doesn't necessarily imply that the dynamics explodes. Far from the steady state, naïve expectations are less precise and, despite being costly, firms eventually prefer rational expectations. As the price reverts to its steady state, prediction errors of naïve expectations decline. Firms return to naïve expectations, and the price starts to deviate from its steady state again. Due to the nonlinear interplay between a centrifugal force close to the steady state and a centripetal force far from the steady state, these price patterns may repeat themselves in an intricate manner.
Rational routes to randomness are a surprisingly robust bifurcation path: Goeree and Hommes (2000) generalize the Brock and Hommes (1997) model to the case of nonlinear demand and supply; in Lasselle et al. (2005) firms switch between rational and adaptive expectations; and Branch and McGough (2008) update the market shares of firms using naïve and rational expectations on the basis of replicator dynamics. Rational routes to randomness can also be observed in other model contexts. In the duopoly model by Droste et al. (2002) , complex dynamics occur if the evolutionary competition between firms' rules is high. In another influential paper, Brock and Hommes (1998) detect rational routes to randomness in an asset-pricing model in which market participants have the choice between technical and fundamental predictors. Quite similar asset pricing dynamics is obtained in the models by Diks and van der Weide (2003) and Brock et al. (2005) in which speculators select between a large number of technical and fundamental predictors; in the models by Hommes et al. (2005) and Diks and van der Weide (2005) in which heterogeneous speculators asynchronously update their beliefs; in the model by Anuvrief and Panchenko (2009) in which different market designs ranging from market clearing setups to market maker scenarios are explored; and in the model by Chiarella et al. (2013) in which heterogeneous speculators can invest in multiple risky assets. Moreover, de Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006) discover complex endogenous dynamics in a foreign exchange market model with heterogeneous speculators. Dieci and Westerhoff (2014) notice boom and bust dynamics in a housing market model resulting from interactions between investors who follow heterogeneous rules to predict housing prices. Finally, we conclude this incomplete list of works by mentioning that Branch and McGough (2010) , de Grauwe (2011), Lines and Westerhoff (2010) and Anufriev et al. (2013a) develop macroeconomic models in which agents' switching between heterogeneous inflation and/or income expectations may lead to rational routes to randomness.
In recent years, models with heterogeneous interacting agents have received considerable empirical support. For instance, laboratory experiments, reviewed in Hommes (2011), reveal that human subjects rely on heterogeneous forecasting rules. Anufriev and Hommes (2012) manage to explain such experimental studies by models in which agents switch between different forecasting strategies. Evidence of heterogeneous expectations in agricultural markets is provided by Baak (1999) and Chavas (2000) . The questionnaire evidence surveyed by Menkhoff and Taylor (2007) reveals that heterogeneous expectations are also a widespread phenomenon in financial markets. Moreover, Boswijk et al. (2007) and Franke and Westerhoff (2012) conclude on the basis of estimated financial market models that stock market traders switch between different expectation rules. Similar evidence is provided by Dick and Menkhoff (2013) and Goldbaum and Zwinkels (2013) for the foreign exchange market; by ter Ellen and Zwinkels (2010) for the oil market; and by Kouwenberg and Zwinkels (2014) for the U.S. housing market. Branch (2004) shows that survey data on inflation expectations can be explained by a heterogeneous expectations and switching model.
Since models with heterogeneous interacting agents are quite powerful and supported by empirical evidence, they are increasingly used as tools for conducting economic policy experiments. For instance, Westerhoff and Dieci (2006) explore the consequences of transaction taxes; Brock et al. (2009) show that additional hedging instruments may destabilize financial markets; Yeh and Yang (2010) discuss the effects of price limits; Anufriev and Tuinstra (2013) model short-selling constraints; Tuinstra et al. (2014) address the optimal size of trade barriers; and Branch and McGough (2010 ), de Grauwe (2011 ), Lines and Westerhoff (2010 and Anufriev et al. (2013) explore whether monetary policy rules may stabilize fluctuations in economic activity. What all of these papers have in common is that they study how certain policy measures influence market participants' actions, in particular their expectation formation behavior. For a survey of this research approach, see Westerhoff and Franke (2014) .
The goal of our paper is to explore whether policy-makers can manage rational routes to randomness by adjusting profit taxes. Our reference point is the cobweb model by Brock and Hommes (1997) . Since firms' (boundedly) rational choices of their expectation rules depend on the profits realized in the past by these rules, policy-makers can principally alter the relative fitness of expectation rules by imposing profit taxes. Profit taxes may thus allow policy-makers to change the mix of expectation rules applied and thereby to stabilize the market's dynamics. But how should policy-makers set profit tax rates? To address this problem, we extend the model by Brock and Hommes (1997) along three dimensions. First of all, we allow policy-makers to raise profit taxes. For simplicity, we focus on the case in which policy-makers impose a proportional tax on positive profits. Second, we work with a slightly more general cost function than that in Brock and Hommes (1997) by additionally considering fixed costs. While fixed costs are irrelevant in their model, they may have nontrivial effects on the global dynamics of our model. Finally, we account for the fact that producers may have a behavioral bias towards using simple expectation rules. According to this assumption, the fitness of naïve and rational expectation rules does not depend solely on past profits, but may also include untaxable behavioral components. All other model parts are specified as in the model by Brock and Hommes (1997) .
Our main results may be sketched as follows. Rational routes to randomness require that the destabilizing naïve expectation rule is fitter than the stabilizing rational expectation rule close to the steady state. The more strongly firms perceive the fitness differentials of expectation rules, the more quickly they will switch between expectation rules, and the more complex the dynamics becomes. We show that, under certain assumptions, policy-makers have the opportunity to completely revert rational routes to randomness. The explanation for this remarkable result is as follows. If firms always make profits and if the fitness of expectation rules depends only on past profits, policy-makers are able to level fitness differences between expectation rules by taxing firms' profits. An increase in the profit tax rate reduces fitness differences between expectation rules and thereby counteracts an increase in the intensity of choice. In general, however, the effectiveness of profit taxes depends on a number of factors. For example, firms do not always make profits, and behavioral preferences for certain expectation rules cannot be affected by profit taxes. Overall, our analytical and numerical results suggest that policy-makers should increase (decrease) profit taxes if destabilizing expectation rules produce higher (lower) profits than stabilizing expectation rules. As we will see, our analysis also reveals a number of more subtle insights. For instance, profit taxes may influence the basin of attraction of the model's steady state and create or destroy coexisting high-amplitude attractors.
Our policy implications are based on the cobweb model by Brock and Hommes (1997) . Nevertheless, we believe that our results are of a more general nature since many economic systems are expectations feedback systems. As discussed in detail in Hommes (2013) , the dynamics of many markets crucially depends on market participants' expectations which, in turn, depend on the current and past outcomes of these markets. According to the aforementioned empirical evidence, human subjects rely in many different situations on heterogeneous rules to predict future economic variables. As a result, the dynamics of the underlying economic system depends on the mix of the rules applied. If market participants change their rules with respect to past performance criteria -which is also suggested by empirical studies -then policy-makers have the opportunity to affect the relative fitness of the expectation rules applied by taxing market participants' profits, income or wealth such that stabilizing expectation rules become more popular and, consequently, the dynamics less unstable.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we generalize the cobweb model by Brock and Hommes (1997) . In section 3, we present our analytical results.
In particular, we derive the model's steady state and discuss how its local asymptotic stability is affected by the intensity of choice and profit taxes. In section 4, we present various numerical results to illustrate how the model's global dynamics depends on the intensity of choice and on profit taxes. In section 5, we summarize our main results and highlight a few avenues for future research.
An evolutionary cobweb model with profit taxes
In this section, we generalize the seminal cobweb model by Brock and Hommes (1997) . The setup of our model is presented in section 2.1; its dynamical system is then derived in section 2.2.
The model's setup
Cobweb models describe the price dynamics of a competitive market for a non-storable good that takes one time period to produce. Producers must thus form their price expectations one time period ahead. Brock and Hommes (1997) assume that firms switch between a free naïve and a costly rational expectation rule. Moreover, a firm's choice of an expectation rule depends on the relative past performance of the respective rule. For high values of the intensity of choice, the firms' rule selection behavior may cause complex endogenous dynamics, and prices may deviate substantially from their steady state. To explore whether policy-makers are able to manage such dynamics, we extend the model by Brock and Hommes (1997) 
where 0 , > b a . Firms need to form price expectations one period ahead and choose between two different expectation rules to determine their production decisions. Normalizing the number of firms to one, their total supply can be represented as 
remains as in Brock and Hommes (1997) notational simplicity, been omitted in the firms' maximization problem (4).
The market shares of firms holding either naïve or rational expectations are updated over time according to an evolutionary fitness measure. Firms are boundedly rational in the sense that they tend to choose the forecasting strategy with the highest fitness which, in turn, depends on profits realized in the past. Since we also consider the firms' behavioral preference towards certain prediction strategies (e.g. Branch 2004 , Franke and Westerhoff 2012 , Anufriev et al. 2013b , the fitness of naïve and rational expectations is defined as
and If pre-tax profits are positive, profits realized by naïve producers are given by
, while profits realized by rational firms amount to
. Of course, firms are not required to pay profit taxes if their profits are not positive. For the two forecasting strategies, profits realized in period t can be expressed by the two parted functions
and 1 It is easy to extend our analysis to 0 < B , i.e. to the case in which firms have a behavioral preference towards rational expectations. A number of results for this scenario are sketched in footnote 2.
respectively. Brock and Hommes (1997) determine the market shares of producers that choose naïve or rational expectations via the discrete choice approach taken by Manski and McFadden (1981) . Therefore, we have
Note that the greater the fitness of an expectation rule, the more firms will rely on it.
Parameter 0 ≥ β may be regarded as the firms' intensity of choice. It measures how sensitive firms are to selecting the most attractive predictor. For 0 = β , firms do not observe any fitness differentials between the two forecasting strategies, and both market shares will equal ½. The higher the intensity of choice, the more firms will select the prediction strategy with the greatest fitness. For ∞ = β , fitness differentials are observed perfectly and all firms will choose the predictor that yields the greater fitness.
The model's dynamical system
Let us next derive the model's dynamical system. Combining (1)- (3) with (5)- (6) yields
Since 1 
Moreover, solving (13) . Moreover, we define the difference between the market shares of the two expectation rules as
corresponds to the case in which all producers hold rational (naïve) expectations. As in the original model by Brock and Hommes (1997) , the dynamics of our model is driven by a twodimensional nonlinear map. If we denote by
the relative fitness of rational expectations versus naïve expectations, we obtain for our setup the dynamical system 
where
The relative fitness function defined in (18) contains four branches. Since t µ and t ω represent pre-tax profits of naïve and rational firms, expressed in deviations from the steady state price, the first, second, third and fourth branch imply that all firms make profits, only naïve firms make profits, only rational firms make profits and no firms make profits, respectively. Note that for 0 = τ 
A number of analytical results
In this section, we present our analytical results. In section 3.1, we derive the steady state of our model and a necessary and sufficient condition for its local asymptotic stability. In section 3.2, we examine how the intensity of choice and profit taxes affect the model's steady state and its local asymptotic stability.
Steady state and local asymptotic stability
In general, a firm's steady-state profits may be positive or negative. Since firms cannot permanently sustain losses, from now on we impose the following viability condition
which ensures that firms' steady-state profits (with and without tax payments) are positive. As a result, the steady-state value of the rules' relative fitness (18) can be expressed as
Under assumption (21), the model's unique steady state is given by
Recall that a necessary and sufficient condition guaranteeing that a steady state of a twodimensional nonlinear map is locally asymptotically stable is that the two eigenvalues of its Jacobian matrix, calculated at the steady state, are less than one in modulus (see, e.g. 
Note first that in this case, which corresponds to the model by Brock and Hommes (1997) , 
Obviously, the steady state and its local asymptotic stability are independent of τ . This is because pre-tax profits generated by naïve and rational firms are identical at the steady state and subject to the same profit tax rate, which is why differences in profits are always equal to zero. Accordingly, policy-makers are unable to reestablish market stability by taxing producers' profits. However, the global dynamics of our model is affected by taxes, which we outline in more detail in section 4. Remember that fitness differences in case X are due to profit differences, which can always be leveled by an increasing tax rate so that the steady state remains stable. In case Z , however, fitness differences occur not only via profit differences, but also due to parameter B .
Since the behavioral preference towards naïve expectations is not taxable, profit differences need to be reduced more strongly than in case X in order to obtain the same stability property. This can only be realized by a higher profit tax rate. Profit differences, therefore, do not need to be reduced as strongly as in case X to increase the fitness of rational expectations. Branch (2004) argues that individuals have a behavioral preference towards rational expectations.
At least with a view to market stability, this may be good news for policy-makers.
A number of numerical results
In this section, we present a number of simulations to illustrate how the global dynamics of our model depends on the intensity of choice and on profit taxes. In section 4.1, we first explain the general design of our numerical experiments. In sections 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4, we then explore our model's dynamics for cases X , Y and Z , respectively.
Preliminaries
Our analytical results provide important insights about how the intensity of choice and the profit tax rate affect the model's steady state and its local asymptotic stability. As we will see, our analytical results also help us to understand the model's global dynamics. To study the global behavior of our model, we consider the following five parameter constellations: 
, where H and L stand for high and low steady-state profits, respectively.
To analyze the effect of both the intensity of choice and the profit tax rate on our model dynamics, we use β and τ as bifurcation parameters. In all bifurcation diagrams, the bifurcation parameter is increased in 500 discrete steps, while all other parameters remain constant. For each parameter value, we plot 30 observations after erasing a transient phase of 1000 periods. For some parameter combinations, we present basins of attraction of the steady state and other coexisting attractors. For these computations, a transient phase of 1000 periods has been omitted. To investigate whether our results are robust, we occasionally add exogenous noise to the dynamics. In these experiments, we then add a normally distributed random variable with mean zero and standard deviation 0.10 to the evolution of t p in (16).
To be able to quantify the effect of profit taxes on our model dynamics, we introduce two statistics. As a measure of the variability of prices, we define
to identify the market's mispricing we use
3 To be precise, the value of parameter a is irrelevant in the model by Brock and Hommes (1997) . In our model, parameter a may render a firm's profits positive or negative and thus for 0 > τ it has an impact on its global dynamics. Since it is more intuitive to control the size of a firm's profits via parameter d , we keep parameter a constant at 10 = a
where T represents the length of the underlying sample. When we compute these statistics, we add the aforementioned exogenous noise to the dynamics, omit a transient phase of 1000 periods and use a sample length of 5000 = T periods.
The dynamics of the model in case X
We start our numerical analysis with case ) (H X , i.e. we set 1
these assumptions, our model corresponds to that by Brock and Hommes (1997) (17) and (18) can be combined to emerges abruptly with a significant amplitude and not smoothly, as in case ) (H X . We investigate this intriguing phenomenon, caused by the emergence of coexisting attractors, in more detail in figure 3 . Second, while profit taxes also stabilize the dynamics in case ) (L X , the effect is less powerful than in case ) (H X .
[ Figure 2 about here]
The bifurcation diagram in panel (c) of figure 2 also reveals that an increasing tax rate decreases the amplitude of price fluctuations. Moreover, a convergence to the steady state sets in again when τ exceeds 0.84. However, the bifurcation route differs from the bifurcation route in panel (c) of figure 1. In particular, the stabilizing effect of increasing profit taxes is much weaker. Furthermore, panel (c) of figure 2 also suggests that the steady state may coexist for some values of τ with other types of attractors (which we will also discuss in figure 3 ). In panel (d), we observe that the stabilizing effect of an increasing profit tax rate holds with respect to exogenous noise which, in turn, is further supported by panels (e) and (f). Both volatility and distortion decrease smoothly as the profit tax rate increases from 0 to 1, although the effect is weaker than in case ) (H X . Let us briefly summarize our numerical results for case X. Due to information costs, naïve firms make (on average) higher profits than rational firms. As the intensity of choice increases, more and more firms thus switch to naïve expectations and the amplitude of price fluctuations increases. By imposing profit taxes, policy-makers have the opportunity to reduce profit differences between naïve and rational expectations. If they do this, more firms will rely on rational expectations, and the price dynamics becomes dampened. The stabilizing effect of profit taxes is particularly strong if both types of firms continuously generate profits. Naturally, if a firm's profits are negative, it does not have to pay taxes. The more frequently the firm's profits are negative, the lower the stabilizing effect of profit taxes. We have also seen that the dynamics of our model may give rise to coexisting attractors. Numerical evidence suggests that the steady state's basin of attraction increases with the profit tax rate while the amplitude of the fluctuations of the coexisting attractor decreases simultaneously.
Overall, policy-makers may thus want to increase the profit tax rate in case X to stabilize the dynamics. as the profit tax rate increases. While the destabilizing effect of profit taxes seems to be rather weak in absolute terms, volatility and distortion more than triple in relative terms.
[ Figure 4 about here]
How do profit taxes influence the dynamics of our model in case ) (H Y ? Let us begin with the scenario depicted in panel (g) of figure 4 in which the steady state is locally asymptotically stable. In the absence of information costs ( 0 = F ), firms using the naïve or the rational expectation rule realize identical pre-tax profits. Since both types of firms are subject to the same profit tax rate, differences in profits are equal to zero and therefore independent of τ . If we exogenously stimulate the dynamics by adding noise, the picture starts to change. In the presence of price fluctuations, rational expectations deliver more precise predictions than naïve expectations and are thus more profitable. If these profit differences are taxed away, fewer firms opt for rational expectations, and price fluctuations increase. The explanation for what is occurring in panel (c) is similar. Recall that firms have a behavioral preference towards the simple expectation rule, which is why more and more firms use naïve expectations as the intensity of choice increases. When prices start to fluctuate, rational expectations outperform naïve expectations. However, the economic fitness advantage of rational expectations decreases with the profit tax rate. Since the behavioral fitness advantage of naïve expectations is not taxable, firms switch from rational expectations to naïve expectations as the profit tax rate increases and, therefore, price fluctuations amplify.
Clearly, policy-makers who intend to stabilize the dynamics should promote rational expectations by decreasing profit taxes. . This finding also holds in a noisy environment, as is witnessed in panels (h), (i) and (j). In the (unrealistic) limit in which firms always make losses, profit taxes obviously become irrelevant for the model dynamics.
[ Figure 5 about here] Let us summarize our numerical results for case Y. Due to firms' behavioral bias towards naïve expectation rules, more and more firms abstain from rational expectations as the intensity of choice increases. Consequently, the model's steady state becomes unstable and endogenous dynamics set in. When policy-makers impose profit taxes, the profit advantage of rational expectations decreases while the behavioral advantage of naïve expectations remains constant. This leads to fewer firms relying on rational expectations and less stable price dynamics. To foster market stability, policy-makers may wish to promote rational expectations by decreasing profit taxes. Overall, the destabilizing impact of profit taxes depends on both the level of the intensity of choice and the level of steady-state profits.
If the intensity of choice is low, firms do not realize fitness differentials very well. Policymakers can then only moderately affect the behavior of firms by changing the profit tax rate.
If steady-state profits are low, price fluctuations may drive firms' profits into the negative zone. The more frequently firms make losses, the less effectively policy-makers can use profit taxes to control the fitness difference between naïve and rational expectations.
The dynamics of the model in case Z
Before we begin with our numerical analysis of case Z, let us briefly contrast the key results of cases X and Y. In case X, free naïve expectations generate (on average) higher profits than costly rational expectations. Policy-makers seeking to calm down price fluctuations thus have , and the price dynamics is, for a given value of β , more volatile (see figure 1, panel (b) ). The explanation of why profit taxes work less effectively in case ) (H Z than in case ) (H X is as follows.
Fitness differences in case ) (H X result from profit differences only, while in case ) (H Z they also contain a (tax-independent) behavioral component. As a result, the fitness difference is not reduced as strongly as in case ) (H X when profit taxes are imposed. Put differently, to obtain the same fitness difference as in case ) (H X , profit differences have to be reduced more strongly. As revealed by our analytical results, this can be achieved by imposing a higher tax rate. For instance, policy-makers have to increase the profit tax rate from [ Figure 6 about here]
Whether profit taxes have to be increased or decreased to improve market stability depends, amongst others, on the intensity of choice and the associated price variability. To exemplify this point, we choose three different values for the intensity of choice. In panels (c), taxes. For some parameter constellations, however, we observe that an increase in the profit tax rate initially stabilizes the dynamics, but then destabilizes it.
Conclusions
The dynamic behavior of many markets depends crucially on the expectations of their market participants. Empirical evidence reveals that market participants use different rules to form their expectations. As a result, the dynamic behavior of a market depends on the mix of expectation rules applied. For instance, a market may be rather stable if stabilizing expectation rules are more popular than destabilizing expectation rules. Empirical evidence furthermore indicates that the market participants' selection of expectation rules depends on economic fitness criteria such as profits realized in the past. In line with these observations, Brock and Hommes (1997) develop a cobweb model in which firms adapt their price expectations by a profit-based switching between free naïve expectations and costly rational expectations. One of their key results is that fixed-point dynamics may turn into increasingly complex dynamics as the firms' intensity of choice (i.e. their response to fitness differences)
increases. The main contribution of our paper is to show that policy-makers may be able to manage such rational routes to randomness. In particular, we find that policy-makers should increase (decrease) profit taxes if destabilizing expectation rules generate higher (lower) profits than stabilizing expectation rules. This alters the composition of expectation rules applied in favor of more stabilizing expectation rules and thus calms down a market's price fluctuations.
To make the exposition of our arguments as clear as possible, we use the seminal cobweb model by Brock and Hommes (1997) as a simple, yet powerful reference model. Our analysis may be extended in various directions. For instance, one may equip firms with different and/or more expectation rules to forecast futures prices. Policy-makers would then have to determine whether the more stabilizing or more destabilizing expectation rules produce higher profits. As revealed by our analysis of case ) (H Z , there may be a nontrivial relation between market stability and profit tax rates. Identifying volatility-minimizing profit tax rates may be a challenging task in reality. One may also substitute the discrete choice approach of Manski and McFadden (1981) with another switching model, i.e. the transition probability approach of Weidlich and Haag (1983) . Alternatively, one could think about investigating the stabilizing effects of other tax measures. For example, what are the consequences of revenue taxes, lump sum taxes or subsidies? Moreover, the model by Brock and Hommes (1997) is a partial equilibrium model. How do our results change in a general equilibrium framework? In our setup, tax revenues are not redistributed and our focus is on market stability. Against this backdrop, a welfare analysis may be worthwhile. Instead of exploring the dynamics of cobweb markets, one could also study different markets, say financial markets in which traders have to pay taxes on their speculative profits.
Nevertheless, our paper reveals that, as long as the market participants' selection of their expectation rules depends on economic fitness criteria, policy-makers can affect the mix of the expectation rules applied promoting market stability. Given the volatility of real markets, we regard this as an important insight. 
